Celebrities as Role Models Essay Example for Free

Celebrities as Role Models EssayThe Supreme butterfly ruled against a former high tame assimilator Monday in the Bong Hits 4 Jesus measure chemise a split decision that limits assimilators indigent speech recompenses. Joseph Frederick was 18 when he unveiled the 14-foot paper subscribe on a reality sidewalk outside his Juneau, Alaska, high shoal in 2002. Principal Deborah inter guinea pig international Morse code code confiscated it and suspended Frederick. He sued, taking his face all the way to the nations highest court. The justices ruled that Fredericks free speech rights were non violated by his suspension system over what the majoritys written opinion called a sophomoric touchstone. It was reason up to(p) for (the principal) to conclude that the pennant promoted illegal medicate use and that failing to act would send a powerful message to the scholarly persons in her charge, Chief referee John Roberts wrote for the courts 6-3 majority. Breyer noted separ ately he would give Morse adequate immunity from the lawsuit, but did not sign onto the majoritys broader free speech limits on scholarly persons.Roberts added that while the court has limited student free speech rights in the past, young people do not give up all their world-class Amendment rights when they enter a check day. Roberts was supported by Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, Stephen Breyer, and Samuel Alito. Breyer noted separately he would give Morse qualified immunity from the lawsuit, but did not sign onto the majoritys broader free speech limits on students. In dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens said, This compositors reference began with a silly nonsensical touchstone, (and) ends with the court inventing out of whole cloth a special First Amendment rule permitting the censorship of any student speech that mentions medicates, so ample as someone could perceive that speech to contain a latent pro-drug message.He was backed by Justice s David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. At issue was the discretion directtimes should be allowed to limit messages that appear to advocate illegal drug use. Bong, as noted in the appeal filed with the justices, is a slang term for drug paraphernalia. The incident occurred in January 2002 just outside drill grounds when the Olympic torch relay was moving through the Alaska corking on its way to the Salt Lake City, Utah, Winter Games. Though he was standing on a world sidewalk, the train argued Frederick was part of a school-sanctioned event, because students were let out of classes and accompanied by their teachers.Morse ordered the senior(a) to take down the sign, but he refused. That led to a 10-day suspension for violating a school form _or_ system of government on promoting illegal drug use. Frederick filed suit, saying his First Amendment rights were infringed. A federal appeals court in San Francisco agreed, conclude the school could not show Frederick had disrupted t he schools educational mission by showing a pennon off campus. Former independent counsel Kenneth Starr argued for the principal that a school must be able to fashion its educational mission without undue hindsight from the courts. http//articles.cnn.com/2007-06-25/justice/free.speech_1_principal-deborah-morse-banner-case-school-policy/2?_s=PMLAWhttp//www.aclu.org/free-speech/aclu-slams-supreme-court-decision-student-free-speech-caseWASHINGTON The American Civil Liberties Union today criticized the Supreme hooks 5-4 ruling in Morse v. Frederick, which held that Alaska public school officials did not violate a students free speech rights by punishing him for displaying a banner during a public event. We are disappointed by the Supreme Courts ruling, which allows the censorship of student speech without any evidence that school activities were disrupted, said Douglas K. Mertz, an ACLU cooperating attorney who argued the case before the Supreme Court. The case arose in 2002 when Jose ph Frederick, then a student at Juneau-Douglas High School in Juneau, Alaska, was suspended for 10 days for holding up a humorous sign that the principal interpreted as a pro-drug message. As the ACLU and Mertz noted, the sign caused no disruption, was displayed at the Olympic Torch Relay a public event on public streets and Frederick had not but arrived at school for the day.The Courts ruling imposes new restrictions on student speech rights and creates a drug exclusion to the First Amendment, said Steven R. Shapiro, ACLU National Legal Director. The decision purports to be narrow, and the Court rejected the most brush arguments for school censorship. But because the decision is based on the Courts view closely the value of speech concerning drugs, it is exhausting to know what its impact will be in other cases involving unpopular speech. The Court cannot have it two ways, Shapiro added. Either this speech had nothing to do with drugs, which is what Joe Frederick claimed al l along, or it was suppressed because school officials disagreed with the viewpoint it evince on an issue that is very much the subject of debate in Alaska and around the country.Frederick said that the formulate on the banner, Bong Hits 4 Jesus, was never meant to have any substantive meaning. It was certainly not think as a drug or religious message. I conveyed this to the principal by explaining it was intended to be funny, subjectively interpreted by the reader and most importantly an exercise of my inalienable right to free speech. The ACLU noted that the ruling is limited to rights under federal law rather than Alaska state law, which is more antifertility of personal liberties. The fight to defend free speech will go on, both in this case and in others, Mertz said. We are grateful for the many Alaskans and Americans who rallied to defend the First Amendment and promise our continued support for well-mannered liberties.The case attracted support from more than a dozen gro ups across the ideological spectrum, from the conservative American spirit for Law and Justice, Christian Legal Society and Rutherford Institute to the scholarly person Press Law Center, Lambda Legal justification and Education Fund, Drug Policy Alliance and National Coalition Against Censorship. More information on the case is online at www.aclu.org/frederick The decision is online at www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/06-278_All.pdf In addition to Mertz and Shapiro, attorneys for Frederick are Catherine Crump and Jonathan Miller of the national ACLU and Jason Brandeis, Legal Director of the ACLU of Alaska. http//www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/06-278.ZS.htmlAt a school-sanctioned and school-supervised event, petitioner Morse, the high school principal, saw students change surface a banner stating BONG HiTS 4 JESUS, which she regarded as promoting illegal drug use. Consistent with established school policy prohibiting such messages at school events, Morse directed the stude nts to take down the banner. When one of the students who had brought the banner to the eventrespondent Frederickrefused, Morse confiscated the banner and later suspended him. The school superintendent upheld the suspension, explaining, inter alia, that Frederick was check because his banner appeared to advocate illegal drug use in violation of school policy. Petitioner school board also upheld the suspension. Frederick filed suit under 42 U. S. C. 1983, alleging that the school board and Morse had violated his First Amendment rights.The District Court granted petitioners summary judgment, ruling that they were entitled to qualified immunity and that they had not infringed Fredericks speech rights. The Ninth forget me drug reversed. Accepting that Frederick acted during a school-authorized activity and that the banner expressed a convinced(p) sentiment about marijuana use, the court nonetheless found a First Amendment violation because the school punished Frederick without demon strating that his speech threatened substantial disruption. It also concluded that Morse was not entitled to qualified immunity because Fredericks right to display the banner was so clearly established that a conjectural principal in Morses position would have understood that her actions were unconstitutional.Held Because schools may take stairs to safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that can sanely be regarded as promote illegal drug use, the school officials in this case did not violate the First Amendment by confiscating the pro-drug banner and suspending Frederick. Pp. 515. (a) Fredericks argument that this is not a school speech case is rejected. The event in question occurred during blueprint school hours and was sanctioned by Morse as an approved social event at which the zones student-conduct rules expressly applied. Teachers and administrators were among the students and were charged with supervising them. Frederick stood among other students across the street from the school and directed his banner toward the school, making it plainly visible to most students.Under these circumstances, Frederick cannot claim he was not at school. Pp. 56. (b) The Court agrees with Morse that those who viewed the banner would interpret it as advocating or promoting illegal drug use, in violation of school policy. At least two editions of the banners wordsthat they constitute an imperative encouraging viewers to smoke marijuana or, alternatively, that they celebrate drug usedemonstrate that the sign promoted such use. This pro-drug interpretation gains further plausibility from the paucity of alternative meanings the banner might bear. Pp. 68. (c) A principal may, agreeable with the First Amendment , restrict student speech at a school event, when that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.In chub mackerel v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503 , the Court declared, in holding that a policy prohibiting high school students from wearing antiwar armbands violated the First Amendment , id., at 504, that student facial expression may not be suppressed unless school officials reasonably conclude that it will materially and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school, id., at 513. The Court in Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U. S. 675 , however, upheld the suspension of a student who delivered a high school assembly speech employing an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor, id., at 678. Analyzing the case under Tinker, the lower courts had found no disruption, and therefore no basis for discipline. 478 U. S., at 679680. This Court reversed, holding that the school was within its permissible authority in imposing sanctions in response to the students offensively lewd and indecent speech. Id., at 685.Two basic principles may be distilled from Fraser. First, it demonstrates that the constitutional rights of students in public school are not automati cally coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings. Id., at 682. Had Fraser delivered the corresponding speech in a public forum outside the school context, he would have been protected. See, id., at 682683. In school, however, his First Amendment rights were circumscribed in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.Tinker, supra, at 506. Second, Fraser established that Tinkers mode of analysis is not absolute, since the Fraser Court did not conduct the substantial disruption analysis. Subsequently, the Court has held in the Fourth Amendment context that while children assuredly do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse gate, the nature of those rights is what is appropriate for children in school, Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U. S. 646 , and has recognized that deterring drug use by schoolchildren is an importantindeed, perhaps compelling interest, id., at 661. Drug abuse by the Nations jejuneness is a serious problem .For example, Congress has declared that part of a schools job is educating students about the dangers of drug abuse, see, e.g., the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act of 1994, and petitioners and many other schools have adopted policies aimed at implementing this message. Student speech celebrating illegal drug use at a school event, in the presence of school administrators and teachers, poses a particular challenge for school officials working to protect those entrusted to their care. The special characteristics of the school environment, Tinker, 393 U. S., at 506, and the political interest in stopping student drug abuse allow schools to restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as promoting such abuse. Id., at 508, 509, distinguished. Pp. 815.http//web.law.duke.edu/publiclaw/supremecourtonline/certgrants/2006/morvfre.html Frederick sued Morse, the principal of his high school, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that his First Amendment rights had been vio lated when Morse suspended him for ten days after he unfurled a banner with the message Bong hits 4 Jesus during a televised parade. The parade took place during the school day students had been released from school to watch the parade faculty were present and loosely supervising the event. Frederick was standing across the street from the school when he displayed the banner. Frederick unsuccessfully appealed his suspension administratively before filing his civil rights claim in order court. The district court ruled in favor of the principal.The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the case was governed by Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, in which the Supreme Court held that school authorities may only suppress the speech of students at school if the authorities can reasonably predict substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities as a burden of the speech. Noting that Morse could not have been concerned about the disruption of educational activities resulting from Fredericks speech, the Ninth Circuit well-grounded that Morse could not punish Fredericks non-disruptive, off-campus speech, even though he was a student, the speech took place during a school-authorized activity, and the speech promoted a social message contrary to the one favored by the school.Finally, the Ninth Circuit held that Morse was not entitled to qualified immunity from money damages, because her conduct violated Fredericks constitutional rights, the right was clearly established under the law, and it would be clear to a reasonable principal that her conduct was illicit in the situation she confronted.